

Series II
Subjects Files,
1916-1973

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June 1959 -
April 1962

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OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, R. I.

COPY

June 25, 1959

Dear Admiral Bates:

It is a great pleasure to invite you to speak once again to the staff and students of the College on "Naval Decision Making" at 8:30 a.m. on Friday, 25 September 1959.

Your audience this year will include the classes from the Naval Warfare, Command and Staff, and Naval Command Courses. We would, of course, like you to give us something along the lines of the outstanding lectures on this subject which you have delivered during the past years.

I am authorized to provide an honorarium of seventy-five dollars for expenses incident to this service.

All of us look forward to the stimulating experience of having you back on our platform this fall, and I sincerely hope your schedule will permit you to be with us.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ S. H. INGERSOLL

S. H. INGERSOLL
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College

Rear Admiral R.W. Bates, U.S. Navy (Ret)
12 Mt. Vernon Street
Newport, Rhode Island

COPY

0161

(1)

Dear Edmund Hayward:

It was a pleasure to see you and chat with you on Friday last ~~about~~ on part about GSD. Needless to say, I thoroughly enjoyed being one of the invited guests ~~at the Harvard Summer College~~ the at this extremely interesting affair and, from what the consultants and planning officers in my committee said I am sure that all of the guests felt likewise.

This is my eighth GSD as a full participant. Although I was here on duty at the College and was present at the birth of GSD, I never attended until I had retired. I was invited, but I always declined, because I was writing my book. However, I did attend the lectures and allowed my staff to serve as staff observers. Thus I learned a lot about GSD. On this basis, I am happy to say ~~that~~ my committee (Committee 5) was up to the highest standards of previous years. ~~On the other hand, I thought~~ ~~I did not think~~ that the planning

0162

(2)

session was scarcely average. Since the yellow sheet enclosed herewith ~~has~~ has no question relating to this plenary session I am seizing this opportunity to comment thereon in this letter.

And now for some general comment.

- ① Lunches: My committee seems to have handled this very well indeed. We lunched at the General Mess US Naval Base on Monday, the General Mess USS Newport News (CA 148) on Wednesday, and at McGowan's restaurant on McConnell Road on Thursday. The two general mess lunches gave the committee members a chance to become ^{acquainted} ~~the~~ the quality of meals provided the enlisted men on board ship and on shore. Negatively speaking, ~~the committee members did not~~ no arrangements seem to have been made for the committee members to either meet any of the enlisted men or members of other committees at these

0163

(3)

Lunches. Instead, the committees kept closely together. This denied the civilians and reserves a chance to chat with other civilians and reserves which is an important facet in GSD.

I think that ~~at least one~~ ^{at least one} lunch at the COM (open) should be a requirement, as here the members of the ~~go~~ committees can wander from one table to another.

(2) Ball: I enjoyed the ball, which ~~seemed to be~~ was well organized and well handled. However, since I have seen many more GSD participants, at these Balls in the past, I am at a loss to discover why they were missing this year.

(b) Professional.

(i) Committee method of operation. My committee this year operated in the same manner as did my committee last year, that is, a student pretentiously selected made a 5-10 minute presentation after using the blackboard of the subject.

4

matter to be discussed at the meeting.

A record of the results of the discussion which followed was maintained daily.

Several of these presentations were of high order and indicated clearly that ~~it~~ the student concerned had worked long and hard to make ~~them~~ so.

Once again ^{as in past years} this record was ^{made} available solely to my committee. Therefore, ~~since~~ ~~considered~~ ~~it~~ ~~highly~~ ~~important~~ ~~for~~ ~~these~~ ~~records~~ ~~to~~ ~~be~~ ~~made~~ ~~available~~ ~~to~~ ~~the~~ ~~Director~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~CSS~~, I must repeat what I said last year - that the staff representative in each section normally cannot long remember accurately what was arrived at ^{and it becomes necessary} ~~and therefore the records~~ must be made available to send a copy of ~~each day's~~ ^{the daily} record to the Director. ^{of the CSS} This is particularly important should the President of the Naval War College decide to introduce one or more committees on the plenary session platform.

0165

(2) lectures.

The ~~left~~ lectures were not particularly good nor especially bad. I thought that the best speakers were Dr. Teller and Admiral Tinner, although it is hard ~~some times~~ to understand ~~the~~ Doctor Teller. I thought that Mr. Helms' lecture ~~was~~ the least effective, largely because his delivery ~~was~~ poor - it was, in what might be termed, a monotone.

The morning lecturers had a great advantage over the afternoon lecturers, because the cocktails at luncheon, in many cases, caused the listener to doze off, thus irritating the speaker and at the same time, depriving the listener of information especially prepared for him. Perhaps it would be well to request all committee members to go slow on "hard drinks" ~~at the~~ during the lunch hour.

(6)

(3) Student Weaknesses.

Finally as regards my committee, I seemed to feel that the education of some of the students and notably those from the Naval Warfare course was seriously lacking in the field of problem solution. I don't think that this applies to those students from the Command and Staff Course, who seem to have considerable work in that field, but I cannot say for sure. ^{Suppose} the main reason for choosing a Naval War College is the improvement of professional judgement in command ~~it follows in other words~~ ^{that most} officers upon graduation should be able to solve difficult military problems. The question in my mind is - can they?

I had a feeling that this question was also in the mind of at least one of the civilian guests.

(7)

(2) Plenary session

As mentioned earlier, I thought that the plenary session was scarcely average. This appeared to be due to the fact that

(a) There were too many (seven) on the panel for the limited time available (about $1\frac{1}{2}$ hours). Recent panels i.e. 1965-1964-1963 and 1962, have consisted of seven members - that in 1961 consisted of but four members. Since I saw the latter with its great success, and have seen the former with their lack of success, I cannot ~~but feel that it would be well~~ ^{if the panel is to be maintained} to reduce ~~the panel to four or five~~ ^{its composition} ~~at the most,~~ members.

(b) The members of the panel were generally inarticulate excepting Dr

(c) ~~Heimer~~, who started ~~autonomously~~ but quickly ~~impaired~~ and ~~the~~ ^{USMC} ~~Warne~~ Colonel Branch, who was surprisingly sure of himself.

(c) This seven man panel (as did the

0168

(8)

~~seven~~ ~~man~~ ~~previous~~ ~~panel~~ ~~questioned~~
~~its members~~ more often than it allowed
the audience to question any or all
members. This was unhappy, as many
would be questioners from the floor
were denied the chance to query the
panel.

3. General

(1) Once again as I have said from
year to year I wish to say that I am
more than ever convinced of the importance
of these discussions in the realm of
National Security and recommend that they
not only be continued but expanded
where possible.

0169

9

(2) And once again I wish to say that I am very appreciative of the privilege of being a guest at this year's GSD. I sincerely hope that any contribution of mine was helpful towards the accomplishment of the objectives of the said GSD.

V.8
Via 01

12 Mt. Vernon Street
Newport, Rhode Island
July 5, 1961

For comment

The President
Naval War College
Newport, Rhode Island

Dear Admiral Austin:

Although I filled out your GSD yellow sheet, as per instructions, I am writing an additional letter to comment more fully on these discussions, as I found the yellow sheet inadequate and, if I may say so, possibly seriously misleading.

This is the third GSD that I have attended as a full-fledged participant, and I feel that it was perhaps the best one of the three. This was not because I found my committee better than in previous years, but rather because I thought that the general arrangements seemed better and because the plenary session was distinctly better, largely because of the "panel".

And now for some general comment:

(a) Administrative.

(1) Luncheons. My committee lunched in town every day excepting on the day when the civilian guests were invited to the President's luncheon at the Commissioned Officers Mess (open). This I believe to have been a mistake. The civilians would like to meet other civilians and, therefore, at least one committee luncheon should be held at the above mess so that the different committees may mingle.

(2) Ball. The ball seemed well handled but ran on too long. I have always felt that the ball should end at 2400 (midnight). Although this year it closed at 0030, it is rumored that many did not go home until later (some as late as 0400). It is, therefore, my recommendation that the ball should not only end at 2400, but the guests should be asked to leave at that time. This will insure fresher minds for the plenary session.

(3) Clambake Club. Although many guests availed themselves of the Clambake Club and reportedly enjoyed it greatly, there were many who wished to do so but could not, because the moderators had made other arrangements. This seems to be largely the fault of the Clambake Club, which failed to invite the moderators. If that had been done then, perhaps, a little more leeway would have been provided by the moderators for those wishing to visit the Clambake Club.

0171

(b) Professional.

(1) Committee method of operation. As mentioned earlier, I have served on three committees during the past three years. Each committee operated differently. In the 1959 committee, the moderator provided nothing for the committee other than the agenda and endeavored to guide the committee into a written record of its deliberations; in the 1960 committee, the moderator provided considerable basic written information daily on each subject under discussion and then, likewise, endeavored to guide the committee into a written record of its deliberations. This year, 1961, the moderator had a designated student member of the committee make a 5-10 minute presentation (often using the blackboard) of the matter to be discussed at that "sitting" and then, like the other moderators above referred to, endeavored to guide the committee into a written record of its deliberations.

Comment: Although all methods proved effective, I believe that the 1960 and 1961 methods were the best. As regards the records of the deliberations, all of the above committees did equally well in providing a written record. It is my understanding that a number of committees failed to maintain such a written record. It is, therefore, strongly recommended that every committee be directed to provide such a record. This helps refresh the minds of the members of the committee and permits the observing staff to see the committees accomplishments.

(2) Plenary Session. As mentioned earlier, I thought that the plenary session was, in general, well done. There were, of course, faults. Among these were: (a) Committee 30—This committee, which was my committee, did not present its case adequately. The material was quite good, but the presentations were given without any particular emphasis, although the presenters were directed to do so. This meant that many listeners who might have been "sold" were not quite sure of what was being said. Also, the action of the moderator in attempting to "reply" directly to all of the questions from the floor, rather than to call upon one of his committee members to reply, proved somewhat ineffective; (b) Committee 31—This committee's presentation was clever with the "rocking chair" and the chair for Caroline, but this was overdone. This same criticism has been leveled before on similar endeavors to "purchase" good humor. While I am not adverse to having some humor on the platform, I think care must be exercised to avoid "overplaying".

(3) The Panel. This was an innovation and a good one. Since the panel was organized with little time for practice, weaknesses were bound to develop; however, I think that it accomplished its purpose and caused considerable questions to be asked by the listeners. I did not agree with certain viewpoints expressed by several of the members of the panel and notably by the military commentator who seemed intent on building "excess nuclear weapons". Committee 30's stand was that a determination should be made as to "when enough's enough".

0172

(4) Yellow Sheet Evaluation. As pointed out earlier, the yellow sheet evaluation is inadequate and gives an impression of a lack of appreciation by the staff of the nature of the GSD. I am, therefore, enclosing a yellow sheet with some suggested changes.


(c) General.

I thought that all of the addresses given by the President and by the distinguished lecturers were excellent, and in very good fashion prepared the way for the committee meetings which followed them.

Finally I wish to say that as a result of this year's GSD, I am more than ever firmly convinced of the importance of these discussions in the realm of National Security and recommend that they not only be continued but expanded where possible.

Needless to say, I am very appreciative of the privilege of being a guest at this year's GSD and sincerely hope that any contribution of mine was helpful towards the accomplishment of the objectives of said GSD.

Very sincerely yours,



R. W. Bates
Rear Admiral (ret.)

Enclosures:

- (a) Questionnaire
- (b) Committee 30 Plenary Session Presentation

0173

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, R. I.

14 March 1962

From: President
To: Curriculum Board
Subj: Curriculum changes

- 1. The comments contained herein are forwarded as guidance in reviewing and improving the curriculum. Although these comments relate particularly to the Naval Warfare Course, they should be considered pertinent to any of our resident courses wherever applicable. As a point of departure reference is made to the Mission and Objectives of the College and to the purpose and content of the Naval Warfare Course as set forth in the Catalog of Courses.*
- 2. The Mission of the Naval War College is broad enough to include any curriculum item that could be related to the preparation of officers for higher command; the fundamentals of warfare, international relations and inter-service operations. However, the Mission clearly places emphasis on the application of all curriculum items to future naval warfare. It is implicit in this Mission that the Naval War College is the only one of the senior service colleges bearing responsibility for the preparation of the Naval commanders of the future. While it is highly desirable to give our students an understanding of international relations and of the non-military factors of national power, it remains essential that they be given the highest feasible degree of professional competence in naval warfare.*
- 3. The three stated objectives of the College are as follows:*
 - (1) The increase of knowledge of the fundamentals of naval warfare and of other related subjects which contribute to an understanding of warfare.*
 - (2) The improvement of mental power and ability to relate this knowledge to the solution of military problems.*
 - (3) The provision of intellectual leadership in the field of sea power and maritime strategy for the armed forces and for the United States and allied nations.*
- 4. These objectives impose the following basic requirements upon the curriculum:*
 - (a) A thorough examination of the fundamentals of naval warfare and of other related subjects which contribute to an understanding of warfare.*

0174

(b) *The development of mental power and professional ability necessary for sound military decision with emphasis on naval situations.*

(c) *A penetrating examination of sea power and maritime strategy both historically and in the present.*

Comment. *It may not be possible to meet the above requirements within the fifty-six day time frame of the Naval Warfare Study. If not, that study should be lengthened as necessary. In meeting these requirements, I visualize: (1) An examination in depth of the fundamentals of naval warfare in both a theoretical and historical context; (2) An additional operational problem in which naval forces play the dominant role.*

5. *The educational philosophy of the War College as expressed in the catalog should be reviewed as an essential background to an examination of our curriculum. A few quotations pertinent to this memorandum follow:*

(a) *"Analysis of wars of the past has shown that there are certain fundamentals ... the application of these fundamentals to a strategic or tactical problem is an art ... The Naval War College seeks to further an understanding of the fundamentals involved ... so that the individual may be better prepared to make proper decisions in similar situations in the future."*

Comment. *This aspect of our curriculum appears to need careful re-examination.*

(b) *"It is essential for an officer in high command to have a thorough understanding not only of his own service but also of the other military services and of the interrelations of the political, economic, sociological and military factors of national power and their impact on military strategy."*

Comment. *I consider these aspects to be adequately covered.*

(c) *"The courses at the War College ... emphasize the study of naval operations in the accomplishment of assigned Navy missions and the employment of sea and naval power in the furtherance of national objectives. These studies ... are developed in relation to a complimentary background of the non-military elements of national power."*

Comment. *This is a good statement of the desired balance between naval and non-military considerations in our curriculum.*

(d) *"The primary functions of a high commander are to make sound military decisions and to provide the benefits of military education and experience ... His basic requirement is ... the ability to analyze a complex military situation .. and to make the best decisions."*

Comment. The above should be interpreted to include preparation of officers to give sound and courageous military advice on politico-military problems at all levels. With very little historical analysis and only one operations problem, I consider our attention to this aspect of our senior course can be improved.

(e) "It is the educational policy of the Naval War College to devote principal emphasis to the promotion of reasoning powers, sound judgment..."

Comment. These can best be achieved by critical analysis of the solutions of real problems which history affords, and by the development of solutions to problems presented in hypothetical situations. Our efforts in this regard deserve careful evaluation to determine their adequacy.

6. It continues to be my desire that the staff undertake a greater portion of the lecture program in order to utilize fully the opportunity to further the mission of the College through continued application and study by the highly able and carefully selected officers who are assigned to this staff. An examination of the subjects to which staff members have been required to address themselves are, with some noteworthy and highly laudable exceptions, mainly orientations, briefings, administrative remarks, and problem critiques. Scholarly, penetrating, professional lectures for which the staff of this institution has been noted are too few. In my opinion, this situation is primarily the result of two factors:

(a) Rigorous, analytical examinations into the lessons of history have been allowed to disappear almost entirely from our lecture program. This is a field of scholarship in which the military man has been deservedly pre-eminent, because by his professional training he is best able to undertake it. Further, he is best able to profit from it.

(b) Among those staff officers who have given lectures, the more senior staff officers are notably absent, so that staff participation in the lecture program has lacked leadership by example.

7. It is desired that the Curriculum Board make recommendations for improvement in the curriculum along the lines indicated.



B. L. AUSTIN

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

4 April 1962

From: Professors C. Jellison, J. Larkin, A. Somit
To: President, Naval War College
Via: (1) Head, Academic Plans
(2) Chief of Staff

Subj: Lectures on Seapower, Proposal for

Encl: (1) Draft of Proposed Lecture Series

1. In keeping with your letter of 14 March 1962 to the Curriculum Board, a committee consisting of the undersigned and Commander D. R. Jones, USN, has prepared, with the encouragement of the Naval Warfare Department, the enclosed draft of a proposed lecture series to be entitled: "Seapower in the 20th Century." Titles and scopes have been suggested and are attached. Also submitted is a general statement of objectives for this proposed series of lectures on seapower.
2. It is envisioned that these lectures would be presented as a related series running through the academic year, and that a high degree of coordination would be achieved in the preparation of the lectures by members of the Naval War College staff.
3. The success of this program would, of course, depend in great measure on the ability of the personnel selected and the time allotted them to do the extensive research and preparation for the individual lectures. Eventually, the individual lectures could conceivably be incorporated into a publication of book length. Such a publication might well represent a major contribution by the Naval War College to maritime and national strategy.

0177

4. The above proposal has been discussed with Captain Raymer and members of his department, and they have indicated considerable enthusiasm for the suggested program. The proposed draft of the lecture series will be discussed further with the Naval Warfare Department, and it is anticipated that refinements of the lectures and scopes will be accomplished. These refinements and modifications will take into consideration the high priority instructional requirements that are contemplated for the staff this summer.

Very respectfully,

C. Jellison
C. JELLISON

J. Larkin
J. LARKIN

Albert Somit
A. SOMIT

Copy to:
Head, Naval Warfare Department

0178

PROPOSED LECTURES
ON
SEAPOWER IN THE 20TH CENTURY

- (1) Seapower and National Greatness
- (2) Expanding Role of Seapower
- (3) Great Britain -- Seapower's Emeritus
- (4) The United States -- Pre-eminent Seapower
- (5) Japan and Germany -- The Misuse of Seapower
- (6) France and Italy -- Seapower's Limitations
- (7) Soviet Union -- Seapower's Challenge
- (8) Modern Technology and Seapower
- (9) The Influence of Seapower on the Current World Crisis

PURPOSE

This lecture series will represent an extension of Mahan's analysis of the relationship existing between seapower and national greatness. The series will include an examination of the nature of seapower and naval strategy during the twentieth century, a period of major technological revolution. It will also examine, as case studies, the use and misuse of seapower by seven nations who attained or retained the status of "great power" during this period.

This lecture series has three major objectives: first, to provide a clearer understanding of the influence of seapower upon national greatness in the twentieth century; second, to trace and analyze critically the major developments in the employment of seapower and naval strategy over this same period of time; and third, to formulate generalizations and principles which will prove significant in planning future naval strategy and effective utilization of seapower, both in peace and war.

SEAPOWER AND NATIONAL GREATNESS

In this lecture, the purpose, organization and major themes of the lecture series will be stated so as to put succeeding lectures in proper perspective. The lecture will then examine the major political technological, economic, social, and military changes in the 20th century which have affected and influenced the development and role of seapower and maritime resources. Finally, the relationship between seapower and other major sources of national strength -- such as, land and airpower, population, ideology, national leadership, economic resources, etc., -- will be summarized.

EXPANDING ROLE OF SEAPOWER

As a consequence of the changes examined in lecture one, the techniques for fulfilling traditional naval missions have changed substantially in the 20th century. Among the missions examined will be defense of the homeland, protection of overseas transport, projection of national power overseas, blockade and interdiction. The use of deployed fleets, submarine warfare, SSBNs, convoy escorts, surveillance systems, HUK groups and other techniques will be studied as methods of accomplishing these missions and examples will be drawn from the practice of the U.S. and other naval powers. This discussion will also deal with the role of maritime capabilities, as distinct from naval forces, as an element of seapower.

GREAT BRITAIN - SEAPOWER'S EMERITUS

This lecture will examine (1) British utilization of seapower as the instrumentality whereby England has retained her position as a great power, (2) the often crucial influence of British naval power upon the major political and military decisions made by England and by the other great powers during this period, and (3) changes and evolutions in British naval doctrine and strategy over this same period of time, with special reference to current British thinking.

THE UNITED STATES - PRE-EMINENT SEAPOWER

This lecture will trace the development of American seapower and the evolution of American naval doctrine in the 20th century. The objective here will not be simply that of a purely historical account but rather an assessment of the major contributions of seapower to U.S. standing as a world power.

Closely related to this analysis will be a critical examination of American naval strategy at three periods during this century -- World War I, World War II, and the Cold War period since 1947. The lecture will conclude with an analysis of the major issues currently facing American naval strategists and an indication of the probable course of American naval doctrine in the foreseeable future.

JAPAN AND GERMANY - THE MISUSE OF SEAPOWER

In contrast to the previously discussed countries, Japan and Germany were both able to achieve the status of first-rank military and naval powers during the 20th century but suffered crushing defeats in the course of World War II.

This lecture will examine the (1) manner in which sea-power was utilized by these nations in achieving their status as great powers, (2) the naval strategies employed by these two powers, and (3) the consequences which followed from their failure to develop both an adequate naval strategy and naval resources commensurate with their national objectives.

ITALY AND FRANCE - SEA POWER'S LIMITATIONS

This lecture will examine the efforts of these two European powers to develop and utilize sea power as a means of retaining, in the case of France, and achieving, in the case of Italy, status as world powers of the first rank. The lecture will deal in critical fashion with the strengths and weaknesses of the policies and strategies pursued by each of these two powers in seeking these objectives.

USSR - SEAPOWER'S CHALLENGE

The lecture will trace the development of Russian seapower from Czarist days to the present, with emphasis upon the consequent changes in both the make-up of Soviet naval strength and in Soviet naval doctrine. The role of the Soviet Navy in World War II will be examined. Special attention will be given to post-World War II Soviet naval developments in doctrine and weaponry and to the present strengths and weaknesses of both, vis-a-vis the United States. The lecture will conclude with an indication of probable future Soviet seapower developments and their implication for the security of the Free World.

MODERN TECHNOLOGY AND SEAPOWER

In the 20th century, technological advances have occurred on such a scale that many naval tactics and strategies have had to be thoroughly overhauled or discarded. The effects on naval missions and strategies of such innovations as (a) atomic weapons (b) ballistic missiles (c) earth satellites (d) nuclear propulsion (e) high performance aircraft (f) communication improvements (g) long range detection devices, will be discussed as they have manifested themselves up to the present. Estimates of future effects and developments will also be made.

THE INFLUENCE OF SEAPOWER ON THE CURRENT WORLD CRISIS

Based upon the concepts and material explored and developed in previous lectures in this series, this lecture will discuss the role of seapower in the present world crisis. Probable trends in seapower and naval strategy will be indicated, with particular reference to the influence of technological advances. The implications of these trends for the continued validity of traditional seapower doctrine will be reviewed, and probable developments will be indicated.